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Vernon W. Ruttan**
It would be hard to imagine any public or private sector investment that has generated a
higher rate of return than the investment that has been made in the system of agricultural research
centers and institutes sponsored by the Consultitative Group on International Agricultural Research
(the CG).  Yet the CG system has not, in its maturity, been granted the luxury of the comfortable old
age that its distinction might seem to deserve.
The CG system is confronted by four challenges:
• Changes in the knowledge base on which its technology rests.
• Changes in the organization and capacity of public and private sector research
  systems that are part of the environment in which it works.
• Changes in the priorities of donor agencies on which it depends for support.
• Change in the public perception of the role of science and technology in meeting
  human needs.
Let me address each of these challenges in greater detail.
                                   
*  Presented 30th Anniversary Commemorative Seminar, International Center for Tropical 
   Agriculture (CIAT), Cali, Columbia, December 12, 1997.
** Regents Professor, Department of Applied Economics and Department of Economics and
   Adjunct Professor, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota.2
Changes in the knowledge base.
It is not possible to overemphasize the changes in the knowledge base over the last 20 years
on which crop improvement rests.  When I was a staff economist at the International Rice Research
Institute in the early 1960s I used to walk with Hank Beachel who, along with Peter Jennings,
developed the first series of high yielding rice varieties to look at his plots.  I recall asking Hank what,
if anything, had occurred in basic biology since he began breeding rice that had influenced his
breeding technology?  His answer was "Nothing"!
Two years ago I had a conversation with a young plant breeder who was spending a  post
doctoral, on leave from one of the CG Institutes in the University of Minnesota Department of
Agronomy and Plant Breeding.  I asked him about the work he was doing on his leave and how it
compared to his work as a graduate student.  He indicated, with some bitterness, "I have been out
of graduate school for only four years and I am already obsolete."
I do not know how you are dealing with this problem at CIAT.  But given the speed with
which the knowledge in molecular biology and the techniques of genetic engineering are progressing
it is an issue that every CG institute and every national agricultural research system must confront.
Although I have illustrated this point with reference to plant breeding it is an issue that confronts
every area of science based technology and practice.
Changes in the Organization and Capacity of Research Systems.
A second major challenge to the CGIAR system will be how to position itself in relation to
the weaker LDC national agricultural research systems, to the stronger LDC national agricultural
research systems (Brazil, India, China, Korea), to the DC national systems and to the private sector
agricultural research systems.  Furthermore the CGIAR system must be in a position to help the3
weaker national systems position themselves in this changing environment.
The magnitude of this challenge is illustrate by comparing the CG system to Pioneer Hy-Bred
International.  Pioneer Hi-Bred International has a research budget of $130 million.  It has
approximately 900 researchers employed at some 140 locations in 29 countries.  The CG system has
a research budget of approximately $225 million.  It has about 900 internationally recruited scientists
and a much larger nationally recruited research staff associated with 16 centers and institutes located
at about 135 sites in about 60 countries.
As private sector research continues to expand and national agricultural systems gain strength
it is going to be necessary for the CG system to think very carefully about its role.  What is it essential
that the CG system must do if it is to be done adequately or at all?  What is the source of the public
goods - of the spillover effects - that originate in the CG system?  Is the CG system organized to
produce the public goods that are needed?  Would it have been possible, for example, for the CG
system to have managed the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored International Program on Rice
Biotechnology?  If not what does this say about the CG system?
I feel quite confident that it is in the interest of the CG system to resolve the intellectual
property issue as soon as possible.  The only way to assure access to what should be public goods
is to register or patent.  To quote your own DG, "It is not possible to give away what you do not
own".
Changes in the priorities of donor agencies.
It has been difficult for those of us who have worked in the field of international development,
to acknowledge how strongly foreign economic assistance was motivated by the Cold War.  In the
case of the United States the level of assistance flows rose and declined with the tension between the4
US and the former USSR.  The same relationship has characterized aggregate bilateral assistance and
multilateral assistance.
The Cold War had less impact on the direction of assistance flows than on the aggregate level.
Ethnic politics in the US have been an important factor directing the flow of assistance resources.
Events such as the world food crises of the 1960s and 1970s shifted assistance flows in the direction
of agricultural development, including agricultural research.  
During the last five or six years I have participated in a number of conferences in which the
implicit agenda seemed to be to find some thing new to be afraid of -- something that would motivate
a renewal of aid flows.  The search for new rubrics, such as environmental security, have not been
effective.  
My own sense is that in the future a higher share of CG institute and center findings will have
to come from past and future CG beneficiaries.  The CG system may need to seek new donors for its
traditional work while drawing on its traditional donors for its new work.  I know that CIAT has
made some progress in this regard, particularly with its rice program.  I am quite sure that substantial
increases will be difficult to achieve.  But it is also very important for the CG system to explore
aggressively the possibility of extending the CIAT rice model to other institutes and for other
commodities.
Changes in the public perception of science and technology.
Popular and political confidence in the capacity of advances in scientific knowledge, and of
science based technology, to meet human needs has eroded.  We continue to be confronted by
dramatic examples such as the effort to stop the shipment of genetically altered soybeans to Germany
and of genetically altered rice seed to the Philippines.  5
It is easy to interpret such events as the misguided efforts of ideologically committed activists.
That is often a valid interpretation.  But the ability of activists to attract a following is a reflection of
more fundamental problems about which the popular intuition is correct.  Let me illustrate with two
examples.
The United States is preeminent in almost every aspect of biomedical science - in both the
underlying basic science and in the clinical applications.  But there is pervasive dissatisfaction in the
US with the institutional arrangements for delivering health services.  Many health indicators for the
US, such as infant mortality rates, rank well below similar health indicators for countries with much
more limited biomedical research capacity.  My sense is that the biotechnology based pharmaceuticals
that are on (or coming on) the market are primarily responsive to the health concerns of the rich, the
old and the fat.  The institutional reforms necessary to enable the poor to lead more healthy lives
continue to be neglected.
There is also a pervasive concern, in spite of the growth of food production, that the
institutional reforms necessary to enable the poor, in both rural and urban areas, to meet their
nutritional needs have seldom been put in place.  Poverty has been reduced and nutrition has been
improved in the rapidly growing economies of East Asia.  Reducing poverty is an effective way to
reduce hunger and malnutrition.  But, as Sri Lanka and Kerala (India), have shown it is not the only
way.  It is not necessary to wait until we are all rich to establish institutions that provide food
entitlements for the poor.  The CG system will be asked to demonstrate that it can contribute to this
objective - particularly in the case of the rural poor.  
The fox and the hedgehog.
In closing I would like to refer to the simile provided by the Chilean historian Claudio Veliz.In his analyses of the economic history of the English speaking and Spanish speaking Americas he
suggests an analogy with the fox and the hedgehog.  The fox knows a little bit of everything.  The
hedgehog knows one big thing.  The analogy, in the Veliz book, The New World of the Gothic Fox
(California, 1994) is not complementary to the hedgehog.  But my own judgement is that if the CG
system is to prosper in the world that is emerging each CG institute must focus its efforts on knowing
one or two big things.7




As we look to the role of public policy - including support for research, the evolution of
intellectual property rights; environmental, health and market regulation - it is useful to remind
ourselves of the role of public policy in the development of the biotechnology industries.
RESEARCH SUPPORT
More than any other industry, the biotechnology industry owes its origin to public support.
• Prior to the mid-1970's almost all research in molecular biology and biotechnology had
been conducted by universities (with foundation and federal funding) and by federal
government (primarily NIH) laboratories.  The initial motivation was the potential
contribution to the solution of human health problems.  The flow of federal funding into
biomedical research associated with President Nixon's "war on cancer" focused much of
the early research in the biomedical area.
• Plant molecular biology and agricultural biotechnology developed later and more slowly
than biomedical.  Progress was inhibited by (a) the dramatic success of plant breeders,
drawing on the techniques of "classical" Mendelian genetics; (b) initial skepticism by plant
breeders about the claims being made by molecular biologists; and (c) funding constraints
in the field of plant molecular biology.
                             
* Presented at conference on Biotechnology and Biosafety, World Bank, Washington, D.C., October
10, 1997.  The paper draws on a chapter "The Biotechnology Industries" in my forthcoming book,
Technology Growth and Development, (in preparation).
** Regents Professor, Department of Applied Economics and Department of Economics, University
of Minnesota and Adjunct Professor, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs.8
SAFETY
• The initiative taken by leading researchers in molecular biology and biotechnology in
calling attention to potential health and environmental dangers was unprecedented in any
field of science.  The 1975 Asilomar Conference, organized by Paul Berg and Maxine
Singer, was the landmark event.  The Conference concluded "that there are certain
experiments in which the potential risks are of such a serious nature that they ought not
to be done with presently available containment facilities" and recommended a
moratorium on such experiments until more secure facilities could be built and appropriate
protecols could be developed.
• By the mid-1980's the legacy of the Asilomar Conference had largely been reversed.  In
the biomedical area almost the entire spectrum of living things had been opened to genetic
manipulation with controls remaining for only limited classes of experiments.  One
observer noted "it is quite remarkable how quickly doubts about safety receded once it
appeared that profits could be made in this new technology."
As this conference indicates, however, safety concerns have remained stronger in the area of
agricultural than in pharmaceutical biotechnology.  These include the affects of introducing transgenic
crops on the genetic integrity of wild species and the emergence of new and more troublesome weeds
and other pests and pathogens.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
• Plant patent and patent like (plant variety registration) property rights had evolved slowly
in the U.S. and other developed countries since 1930.
• The landmark in intellectual property rights for biotechnology was the 1980 judicial9
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court (Diamond vs. Chakrabasty) that extended patent
protection to new microorganisms.
• A major issue that remains unresolved is how broadly life forms can be patented.  Recent
decisions by the U.S. patent and trademark office seem to favor broad interpretations.
Examples:
* The decision to grant a patent for gene therapy that encompasses virtually all gene
therapy involving in vivo technique (to Kelly, Palella and Levine)
* The Abbott-Geneit application to patent genetic markers (of the single nucleotide
polymorplusms-SWPS type).
Students of patent policy have generally concluded that broad grants of property rights are
more likely to inhibit competition than more narrow rights.  Researchers are concerned that the
broader grants could inhibit research.
COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT
• Commercial development of biotechnology has been slower than anticipated two decades
ago.  By the mid-1990's there were still fewer than 30 biotechnology therapeutics and
vaccines on the market.  During the last several years, however, new product approvals
by the FDA has increased rapidly.  Profitability and sustainability of specialized
biotechnology firms have remained problematic.  It seems clear in retrospect that in
addition to a potentially promising commercial product a few "delusion genes" have also
been important in starting up a new biotech company.  
• In the case of agriculture it is only in the last two years that biotechnology products have
become commercially important (bovine somatropen, herbicide resistant soybeans, BT10
corn and cotton).
* Agricultural biotechnology is, at present, "small potatoes".  Pharmaceuticals account
for 90 percent of total sales.  However, agrochemical and agrobiological
biotechnology, which accounted for only about 2 percent of sales in 1995, is now the
most rapidly growing segment of the industry.
• Non medical diagnostics (to detect chemicals, pathogens, and other contaminants in the
food supply and environment) is also growing rapidly.
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
• In the 1990s the market structure of the pharmaceutical industry underwent a major
transformation.  For much of the postwar period the industry had been composed of large
research intensive vertically integrated - from laboratory to distribution- firms.  The rise
of specialized CBC's is dramatically altering the structure of the industry.  It is now
composed of a few marketing firms, many small knowledge intensive biotechnology firms,
associated university research laboratories, and the foundations and government agencies
that support biological, biochemical and biotechnology research.  We are now, however,
seeing a wave of consolidation among the major pharmaceutical companies.
• The structure of the agricultural biotechnology industry is becoming consolidated even
more rapidly than the pharmaceutical industry.  Four corporate (possibly five) groupings--
centered on (a) Monsanto, (b) Novartis (formed by Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz) and Dow-
Elanco, (c) AgrEvo (Hoechst & Sheriny) and (d), Pioneer-DuPont-- are evolving.
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
• The experience of Japan, which tried to develop a biotechnology industry based on its11
dominance in fermentation products, seems to indicate that sufficient depth in both basic
science and in bioengineering are difficult to acquire for the laggards.
• A country may not need to be at the leading edge in the development of either biomedical
or agricultural biotechnology to make effective use of the technology.
- China may be the leading country in the development, testing and utilization of
transgenic plants.  India, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt are also making rapid progress.
- Anther culture and genetic marker techniques are being used by plant breeders in
many developing countries.
- Biopesticides based on BT are being used in a number of development countries.
• But substantial scientific and technical capacity will be required in developing countries
if they are to introduce and manage the diffusion of these technologies safely and
productively.
• There will be winners and losers in both developed and developing countries (1) the health
concerns of the rich, the old and the fat will continue to be served and the institutional
reforms necessary to enable the poor to lead more healthy lives will be neglected. (2)
Producers of agricultural products that continue to be sold as "commodities" -
undiffereiteated maize, oil seeds and cotton - will loose while those who produce the
higher value added fibers, grains and oilseeds will gain.
CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO SURPRISE
• Let me remind you:  (a) No one in the 1950s and few in the 1960s and 1970s would 
have anticipated that agricultural commodity prices would continue their long term decline into the
1990s.
- Wheat prices have declined since middle of 19th century.12
- Rice prices have declined since middle of 20th century.
• Almost no one, particularly the World Bank, anticipated that in the mid 1990s petroleum
prices would be below the levels of the early 1970s.
• It is not possible to anticipate surprises.  The future will be different than the past because
it has not yet occurred!!  It is not unreasonable to expect "surprises" in population, health,
agricultural production and the environment.  (a) The capacity to advance knowledge and
technology is the only "reserve army" available to deal with surprise.  (b)  Most of the
time our research is focused on normal science and incremental technical change.  (c)
When confronted by surprise the trajectory of technical change can be redirected - but
only if the "reserve army" is in place.
• My sense is that the biotechnology industry stands, in it development, at about the same
stage as computers in the late 1950s before the replacement of vacuum tubes by
transistors.  No one committed to 1950s main frame computer development anticipated
the personal computer.
We are just emerging from the first generation stage - doing what we can do by working with
single genes. The second generation will involve multiple genes and the modification of plants, animal
and human components.  The third generation will involve the modification of whole organisms.
• An excessive commitment to avoiding surprise will also mean that we avoid the benefits
from biotechnology.SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SURPRISE:  IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE*
Vernon W. Ruttan
*
We are, in the closing years of the 20th century completing one of the most remarkable
transitions in the history of agriculture.
C  Prior to this century almost all increases in food production were obtained by bringing new
land into production.  By the end of the first decade of the 21st century almost all increases in world
food production must come from higher yields--from increased output per hectare and increased
output per animal unit.
C  In the 19th century almost all differences in agricultural productivity were resource based.
In the 21st century almost all differences will be knowledge based -- on science, technology and
human capital.
C  A few presently developed countries began this transition in the middle of the 19th century.
Others began this transition in the first half of the 20th century.  Most developing countries began the
transition only in the second half, and some only in the last quarter, of the 20th century.
                     
*Paper presented at World Bank Workshop on Emerging Issues in Development Economics,    
Washington, D.C., July 8, 1997.
**Vernon W. Ruttan is Regents Professor in the Department of Applied Economics and the      
Department of Economics, University of Minnesota.14
PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES ON WORLD AGRICULTURE 
Let me refer to Figure 1  (due to Philip Pardey of IFPRI)
C  The vertical axis - biological (and chemical) technology (output/hectare)
C  The horizontal axis - mechanical (and engineering) technology (output/worker)
C  The diagonal lines - hectares per worker
I can not emphasize too strongly the importance of the distinction between biological and mechanical
technology in attempting to understand technical change in agriculture.
Mechanical technology is a substitute for labor
Biological technology is a substitute for land.
Nature is, at this stage in time, appears to be relatively plastic.  A nation can advance either
biological or mechanical technology (or both) depending on which is appropriate.  But - agricultural
technology is not directly transferable across agroclimatic regions.  The capacity to do agricultural
science and technology-experiment station capacity-must be transferred if farmers are to have access
to either modern biological or mechanical technology.15
CLOSING THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP
Research reported by Hayami and Ruttan, in our book Agricultural Development: An
International Perspective (Johns Hopkins, 1985) suggests (from growth accounting based on cross
county regressions) that:
C  With comparable investments in human capital, and
C  With comparable development and use of technical inputs, (including the necessary
investments in location specific agricultural R&D)
most LDC's could achieve levels of output per worker comparable to those of Western Europe.16
Achievement of levels comparable to the United States, Canada, and Australia would, in addition,
require a restructuring leading to larger farm size.
Thus technical change is necessary if output per worker in agriculture is to rise.  But urban-
industrial development is also necessary if income per worker in agriculture is to rise to developed
country levels.
CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO SURPRISE
Those of us (or you, given my age) who will be concerned about technical change in
agricultural and economic development will not escape the need to deal with uncertainty - to respond
to surprise - during the next several decades.
C  The capacity to advance knowledge and technology represents the "reserve army" (to coin
a phrase) for dealing with surprise.
C  Most of the time our research is focused on normal science and incremental technical
change.  Experience suggests that when confronted by surprise the trajectory of technical change can
be redirected. 
TWO SURPRISES OF THE LAST HALF CENTURY
Agriculture.  
No one in the 1950s, and few in the 1960s, anticipated that agricultural commodity prices
would continue their long term decline into the 1990s. 
C Wheat prices have declined continuously since the middle of the 19th century. (Figure 2a)
C Rice prices have declined since the middle of the 20th century. (Figure 2b)17
I have only to refer you to the early post WW II resource assessment studies.  The President's
Material Policy Commission Report estimated, in early 1950s that, in the US, would it would be
necessary to add 100 million acres of agricultural land to production by 1975.  In the 1960s no one,
not even the most enthusiastic of green revolutionaries (of which I was one) anticipated that it would
be possible to raise grain yields (under ideal conditions) from the 2-4 metric ton/hectare range to the
8-10 ton range.
Energy  
The world energy (more correctly, petroleum price) increases of the 1970's is a more recent
example.  If the World Bank petroleum price projections of the 1970s and 1980s can be taken as an
indicator World Bank energy specialists were confronted by a "surprise" every 2 years between 1978
and 1986. (Figure 3)
SURPRISES OF THE NEXT HALF CENTURY*
Surprises, by their very nature, can not be predicted.  The future differs from the past in that
it has not occurred.  But it is not unreasonable to suggest some areas where surprises may occur.
Population
From the late 1930s until well into the 1980s almost every official and unofficial global
population projection indicated that the date at which population would stabilize would be further
into the future than projections made a decade earlier -- and that the level at which population      
               
*In these comments I draw on a National Research Council Board on Sustainable Development
working group discussion, Minneapolis, May 29 and 30, 1997.18
would stabilize would be higher than projections made a decade earlier.
We are now beginning to see, from both official and unofficial sources, projections of a
decline in the level at which the global population level will be stabilized - from the 10-11 billionrange
to the 9-10 billion range around 2050.  I do not know what global population will be in 2050.  My
own sense is that a level of 20 billion is more plausible than 5 billion.  Either could happen.  I will be
surprised, if I am here in 2050, if global population falls within the 9-10 billion range.
Health
The last several decades have seen the resurgence of a number of diseases that had previously
been thought under control - malaria and tuberculosis come to mind.
We have seen the emergence and spread of new infectious disease - AIDs and several other
venereal diseases for example.  The health effects of environmental change are a source of increased
concern.
The prospect has been raised that antibiotics represent a depleting resource.
It is not too difficult to spin out a scenario leading to a global health crisis in the first or
second decade of the 21st century.  Such a health crisis could have serious consequences for food
production in the villages of the worlds poor countries.
Yet we have hardly begun to make investments in the development of health research capacity
in the tropics comparable to the investment in the development of agricultural research capacity that
began in the 1960s.  Instead we have dismantled much of the research capacity in tropical medicine
that already existed.
The "reserve army" needs to be remobilized!19
Environment*
It is unlikely, but not impossible, that in the next decade or two climate modelers might
discover that rising CO2 (and other greenhouse gas) levels are largely due to natural rather
anthropogenic sources.
This would suggest that the policy focus would appropriately shift from abatement to
adaptation.  An adaptation strategy would imply the need to substantially strengthen agricultural,
environmental and health research in the tropics.
Suppose, instead, that climate modlers confirmed that the sources of increase in greenhouse
gasses are largely anthropogenic.  And suppose that social science research confirms, what many of
us suspect, that the national and international institutions needed to abate climate change will not be
put into place until it "hurts".
Would the appropriate policy response to these two alternatives differ?
Biotechnology
Will biotechnology rescue us from the agricultural, environmental and heath surprises such
as those I have suggested?  
My own sense is that progress in biotechnology is today about where progress in the
development of computers and other information technology stood in the late 1950s - before the
development of the transistor to replace vacuum tubes.  
Until a couple years ago, I frequently challenged my friends in biotechnology by
 suggesting that the promise of biotechnology had slipped back 8 years every decade.  I am now
                      
* I am indebted to Tom Schelling for this suggestion.20
more optimistic.  The promise is slipping back only 5 years every decade!
We can anticipate, drawing from the information technology analogy, that the future of
biotechnology will involve surprises that biotechnologists, including those whose own genetic code
contain a sequence of "illusion genes",  do not imagine.  But whether the surprise will realize the
promise seen by some, or the curse anticipated by others, will itself be a surprise.
THE RESERVE ARMY AND THE BIG BANG
My purpose in discussing the role of surprise is to emphasize the inadequacy of development
economists, and of economists generally, in assisting society to prepare for and to confront surprise.
We know very little about the design of science and technology policy for an uncertain future.
We suspect that advances in knowledge and in scientific and technical practice has enabled
those of us who have ordinary talent to accomplish what only those with much greater talent have
been able to accomplish in the past.
But we also observe that when the time is ripe -- when the stage has been set and when the
reserve army is in place - dramatic advances that go beyond normal science and incremental changes
in technology have emerged.
I have in mind the advances made by the Darwins and Mendels, the Edisons and Shocklys and
many others.  I do not understand what calls forth such talent.   But I am confident that if the "reserve
army" is not in place - patiently doing normal science and making incremental advances in technology
- the large advances needed to confront the surprises of the future will be called for - but the response
will be weak!MEETING THE FOOD NEEDS OF THE WORLD*
Vernon W. Ruttan**
We are in the closing years of the 20th century completing one of the most remarkable
transitions in the history of agriculture.  Prior to this century almost all of the increase in food
production was obtained by bringing new land into production.  By the end of the first decade of the
21st century almost all of the increases in world food production must come from higher yields--from
increased output per hectare and increased output per animal unit.
World Food Futures
Perspectives on world food futures have cycled rapidly over the last several decades.  a 1989
study at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) advanced what came to be
referred to as "the 2-4-6-8 scenario" - a doubling of population, a quadrupling of agricultural
production, a sextupling of energy production and an octupling of the size of the global economy by
2050.  Note that it is the growth of the global economy--particularly per capita income growth in the
presently poor countries--that is the source of approximately half of the growth in food demand.
                       
* Presented at "World Food Prize Symposium, Des Moines, Iowa, October 18, 1996. An earlier draft
was presented at the "Symposium on Science and Human Goals in the 21st Century," 25th General
Assembly of International Council of Scientific Unions, National Academy of Sciences, Washington,
D.C.: September 24, 1996. In this note I draw on several papers in Vernon W. Ruttan (ed),
Agriculture, Environment and Health: Sustainable Development in the 21st Century (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1994).
**  Vernon W. Ruttan is Regents Professor in the Department of Applied Economics and in the
Department of Economics and Adjunct Professor in the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public
Affairs, University of Minnesota.22
More recent research has criticized the IIASA projections as implying "whole nations of obese
gluttons."  It now seems apparent, on the basis of newer population, income growth and consumption
behavior projections that global food demand growth will fall in the 2.0-3.0 percent range over the
next 50 years with substantially higher growth rates at the beginning and lower growth rates toward
the end.  We need to be as concerned with the "income gap" as with the potential "food gap."
"People who have money to buy food do not need to do so".
The recent draw down in grain stocks and run up in grain prices have, however, caused some
observers to announce that the long term decline in grain prices, that had made food available to
consumers on increasingly favorable terms since the middle of the 19th century, has finally come to
an end.  In assessing these current predictions it should be recalled that almost identical predictions,
triggered by similar events, were made by some of the same observers in the early and mid-1970's.
My own sense is that the recent decline in percapita production of cereals and the run-up in cereal
prices was largely policy induced.
Constraints on Food Production
As the world's farmers attempt to respond to the demands that will be placed on them over
the next half century they will be confronted by a number of serious constraints.
(1) Scientific and technical constraints.  Gains in agricultural production will be achieved with
much greater difficulty than in the immediate past.  Biotechnology is not yet living up to its promise
to provide an "encore to the green revolution."  Agricultural research budgets have declined in many
developed and developing countries.  And "maintenance research"--the research required to prevent
yields from declining, as a result of land degradation and the co-evolution of pests and disease,--is
rising as a share of research effort.23
(2) Resource and environmental constraints.  Intensification of industrial and agricultural
production is imposing increasingly severe environmental constraints on agricultural production.
These range from (a) the impact of fossil fuel consumption on global climate change, (b) to the loss
of soil resources due to erosion, water logging and salinization to (c) the resistance of weeds, insects
and pathogens to present methods of control.
(3) Health constraints.  A number of indicators suggest that health could emerge as a serious
constraint on agricultural production in the early decades of the 21st century.  These include the
resurgence of malaria and tuberculosis, the emergence of AIDs and a number of other infectious
diseases, the declining efficacy of available antibiotics and the high cost of developing new drugs for
the control of infectious disease.  Little progress has been made in the control of several important
parasitic diseases.  And we are only beginning to confront the environmental health effects of
agricultural and industrial intensification. 
If several of these health threats emerge simultaneously in specific geographic locations it is
not difficult to visualize scenarios in which the number of sick people in rural areas become a serious
constraint on agricultural production!
Institutional Innovation
I am cautiously optimistic about the possibilities of responding to the demands that will be
placed on agricultural producers over the next half century.  My optimism is tempered, however, by
the capacity of the global community to realize a number of important institutional innovations:
• Our capacity to monitor (a) changes in the sources of productivity change in agriculture, (b)
the sources (driving forces) and impact of environmental change, (c) and the sources and
incidence of the emerging insults to health is inadequate.  These capacities must be24
strengthened if we are to respond effectively.
• More effective bridges must be built, both in research and practice, among the agricultural,
environmental and health communities.  At present these three tribes occupy separate and
mutually hostile  "island empires".